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1. Introduction 
When one considers public policies, investing in education seems to be a crucial issue at stake 
in developed countries. For instance, the European Lisbon Strategy and its educational part—
the so-called Education and Training 2010—put the stress on the link between education 
system and social cohesion and establish some educational targets like the share of early 
school leavers, the increase in the part of graduates in master of science and technology, etc4. 
More recently in the United-States, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act points out 
the need of heavily investing in education to “provide jobs now and lay the foundation for 
long-term prosperity”; it focuses notably on early childhood education and higher education.  
In this framework, from a micro point of view it is important to identify the different 
contributors and beneficia ries of these policies. On the one hand, contributors may include the 
State—and tax payers—by way of subsidies to education policy in various way—public 
subsidies for schools, guarantee for student loan, etc. —, consumers of education —students, 
etc. — and their families by mean of tuition fees and/or taxes. On the other hand, the return to 
this education investment is captured by the graduates —mainly by ways of a wage 
premium—, but also by the State insofar as the wage premium of graduates leads to an 
increase in taxes, and that there exists some externalities which would increase the 
productivity of the whole economy. 
According to the traditional approach in education economics, education can be considered as 
a part of human capital that impacts earnings over the course of a lifetime. The gains of this 
investment can be assessed by computing the individual internal rate of return of one 
additional year of education. Since the seminal Mincer (1974) study, measuring the internal 
rate of return to education has become an important dimension of the analysis of education 
choices, which emphasize controlling for endogeneity—Heckman et al. (2006). A 
complementary approach, still underdeveloped in education economics, is the dynamic 
microsimulation method that attempts to take into account the complexity of national socio-
fiscal regimes—for instance, Harding (1993), Mitton et al. (2000). This method enables to 
simulate the diversity of careers in a given tax and transfer regime: basically, the micro-units 
are considered one year older at each new step of the simulation. This ageing process affects 
the probability of changing labour market positions, wages and the corresponding taxes and 
transfers. When education economics are considered, the advantage of a dynamic 
                                                 
4 For more details, see Commission of the European Communities (2005).  
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microsimulation approach is that it includes in the calculation of the internal rate of return to 
education the whole tax and benefit system: for instance, a more complete calculation of the 
internal rate of return to education can be produced if pension schemes and more generally the 
last part of the lifetime are taken into account. The microsimulation approach enables an 
analysis of the distribution of the internal rates of return to education for a given diploma. 
From this point of view, the development of a dynamic microsimulation model is important to 
analyse education policy as an investment, to identify the winners and the losers, as well as 
the macro revenues of these investments that have to be considered over a lifetime. The 
evaluation of these policies has to take into account the socio-fiscal regime but also the 
specificities of the national education system. For instance, there is an analytical tradition in 
socio-economics5 which links education system and the occupation and status on the 
workplace and/or the labour market. In the current appraisal of education in economic 
microsimulation, individual education is often represented by the schooling years’ number. 
The objective of the model presented in this paper is to go further and to present a more 
comprehensive approach of the link between education and the labour market. This 
comprehensive approach takes into account the different diplomas produced by the French 
education system and the careers they lead to. 
In this paper, we present the GAMEO 6 model, which is currently developed at the Economic 
Research Center of EDHEC Business School. GAMEO is a dynamic microsimulation model 
with two main features: (i) it proposes a very precise appraisal of education in France; (ii) it 
focuses on the life course of a given generation. The model is coded with SAS; it has three 
parts. The first part GAMEO-A aims at producing an artificial input data representing a 
chosen generation in terms of gender, diploma and age entering the labour force.  GAMEO-A 
input to produce simulated samples is the French Labour Survey 2003-2005. The number of 
observations in the input data can be calibrated in order to make a trade-off between precision 
of risk analysis and the calculation time. The second part, GAMEO-B, aims at producing 
individual income paths. It simulates the transition between various positions (employment, 
unemployment, inactivity) and the associated income (wage, unemployment benefit, 
retirement pension) as well as some other elements of the socio-fiscal system (income tax). 
                                                 
5 For instance, the seminal work of Maurice and alii  (1982). Gazier and Schmid (2002) and Schmid (2006) are 
more recent work close to this analytical tradition which put the stress on the methodology for international 
comparisons of labour market and social policies and the way to deal with institutions. 
6 GAMEO stands for Generational Accounting and Microsimulation of Educational Output. 
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The third part GAMEO-C aims at computing individual internal rates of return to education, 
based on the different individual simulated trajectories. 
In section 2, we present the way our microsimulation model apprehend the particularity of the  
French education system and its impact on individual trajectories. In section 3, we detail the 
simulation of individual position vis à vis the labour market over their lifetime. In section 4, 
we examine the way the individual income is imputed. In section 5, we explain the way we 
capture individual life expectancy.    
 
 
2. How to apprehend French education system and its monetary outputs 
A comprehensive dynamic microsimulation of education outputs has to take into account the 
specificities of the links between the national education system and the individual trajectories 
on the labour market. In France these specificities concerns mainly higher education.  
In section 2.1, we present the specificities of the French education system which is 
characterized by a structural opposition between the grandes écoles system and the university; 
the way the French Labour Force Survey (FLFS) 2003-2005 enables us to apprehend this 
education diversity is also presented. The section 2.2 explains how it is possible to increase 
the number of diplomas’ categories taken into account in the input data base of GAMEO. We 
present a modelling strategy which enables us to differentiate the elite schools engineers from 
the engineers graduated from other grandes écoles. The section 2.3 explains how it is possible 
to take into account the specificities of French education system on the basis of the French 
Labour Force Survey (FLFS) 2003-2005 to simulate individual trajectories with an important 
heterogeneity in diploma for a given generation. 
 
2.1. The French education system: some stylized facts 
In France, school is compulsory until the age of sixteen. There are some mid-school 
professional degrees for those who choose to enter early the labour force: the Certificat 
d’Aptitude Profesionnelle (CAP) and the Brevet d’Etudes Professionnelles (BEP). At the end 
of the High School there is an exam, the so-called Baccalauréat which it is necessary to pass 
in order to enrol in higher education7. There are three main types of Baccalauréat 8: the 
                                                 
7 There is one exception the Capacité en droit is a higher education diploma in law. This curriculum  is also open  
to those who do not passed the Baccalauréat.  
ha
l-0
03
91
39
3,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 3
 J
un
 2
00
9
 5 
 
general ones—which are declined with a given set of majors—and two specialized 
Baccalauréat —a professional one and a technical one. 
France is particular when one considers the great heterogeneity of tertiary education paths—
see diagram 2.1—and of their corresponding costs. This heterogeneity goes beyond the 
evidence that scientific programmes of study are generally more costly than other 
programmes, and relates to the different institutions in charge of higher education paths and 
their place in the educational system.  
Traditionally, at the end of high school, students have to choose between two paths: the State 
universities and the higher education institutions known as grandes écoles. The universities 
are a quasi no-charge system whatever the subject area chosen by the student. The grandes 
écoles involve two steps. The first step consists of two years in a State-subsidized preparatory 
class (Classe préparatoire aux grandes écoles) that is free of charge. The second involves 
three years in a grande école. For this second step the choice of the student subject area has 
financial consequences: engineering schools are subsidized by the State, whereas business 
schools are much less heavily subsidized and charge their students high fees. There is a 
traditional ranking of the grandes écoles which lead to identify a sub-group of elite schools. 
The range of this elite school category is difficult to identify clearly; from a statistical point of 
view, the ‘the French Labour Force Survey 1990-2002 identify an ad hoc specific class for 
elite school that has been abandoned in the more recent surveys—see section 2.2.  
Aside from these two traditional main paths, there are some other specific diplomas: a two-
year technical one known as a BTS (Brevet de Technicien du Supérieur) and offered by 
technical schools, the DUT (Diplôme Universitaire de Technologie) and the DEUST 
(Diplôme d’Etude Universitaire Scientifique et Technique); these last two are two-year 
specialized degrees offered at some universities.  
Public expenditures for a student in France are thus closely related to the student’s higher 
education path. These differences stem mainly from staff spending: preparatory classes and 
grandes écoles offer small classes, whereas university teaching is generally done in large 
lecture halls.   
In France, few statistics are available on the real cost of training when one considers the 
diploma obtained. However, Zuber (2004) proposes an evaluation of the mean costs of the 
higher education diploma for the State. 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 See diagram 2.1. 
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Differences in individual higher education costs stem from the number of years of education, 
the education path and the major. The cost of an additional year of higher education differs 
greatly according to the education path. The average cost per year for a two-year university 
diploma is 2,453 euros, whereas the average cost per year for an engineering school diploma 
is nearly five times higher. When we also consider the years in preparatory schools, the total 
cost of an engineering school diploma is twelve times higher. This difference is only partially 
explained by the increasing cost of a year of higher education with the level of education. 
When one considers the same level of education, engineering school costs are more than three 
times higher than the same level university degree.  
When one considers the elite schools, the subsidized cost is more than sixteen times higher 
than that of a five-year university degree. One can argue that the costlier scientific curriculum 
of engineering schools accounts for these differences. However, according to Zuber (2004), 
the differences in costs remain. If one considers only scientific university programs, 
engineering schools are still one and a half times more costly 
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Diagram 2.1. The French education system 
 
 
 
The FLFS 2003-2005 contains a variable which identifies the higher diploma obtained. It 
enables us to retain twenty classes of diploma: 
1- No diploma. 
2- CAP/BEP. 
3- Baccallauréat Général. 
4- Baccallauréat Professionnel. 
5- Baccallauréat Technique. 
6- Capacité en droit (University). 
7-  DEUG (University). 
8- DUT or DUST (University). 
9- BTS. 
10- Higher educated technician diploma. 
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11- Paramedical diploma. 
12- Licence (University). 
13- Other three-years graduate degree. 
14- Maîtrise (University). 
15- DEA (general master at University). 
16- DESS (professional master at University). 
17- Master of Business Schools. 
18- Master of Engineering Schools.  
19- Doctorat (PhD), medical degree (University). 
20- Doctorat (PhD), other major (University). 
 
One important limit of this classification of diploma is that it is not possible to identify the 
graduated from elite Schools which concerns mainly engineering Schools. The following 
section explains the modelling strategy chosen to take into account the graduates from elite 
schools in the GAMEO model.  
 
 
2.2. Determining elite school’s graduates in the input data  
In the FLFS 2003-2005 there are no data on the elite schools of the French higher education 
system. However, for the FLFS 1990-2003 it is possible to identify some individuals with a 
degree from the ‘most prestigious’ grandes écoles. It is an ad hoc classification, some classes 
of which mix engineers, but also some law schools, and other elite schools mainly for civil 
servants —Ecole nationale d’administration,Ecole normale supérieure, Science Po, etc.9  
When one estimates an earning equation with the FLFS 1990-2002, first for the ‘most 
prestigious’ schools and then for these schools and the other engineering schools, one could 
note that the main difference concerns the intercept of the equation, which is higher for the 
‘most prestigious’ schools (table 2.1), and the coefficients, which are not directly comparable 
with those of the equation estimated on the FLFS 2003-200510—this could be the result of a 
major change in data collection in 2003. 
                                                 
9 For a description of this class, see Albouy and Wanecq (2003).  
10 See section 4, table 4.1 for the detailed estimates based on the FLFS 2003-2005. 
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It is possible to estimate a wage equation for the ‘most prestigious’ engineering schools for 
the period from 2003 to 2005, making the following assumptions: 1) the elite engineering 
schools do not differ from the ‘most prestigious’ higher education schools category 
considering the coefficients estimated in the wage equation; 2) only the level of the intercept 
differs when one considers the wage equation coefficients of the graduates of the elite schools 
and those of the graduates of normal schools; 3) the proportion between the intercepts is the 
same whatever the period considered.  
 
Table 2.1. Estimation of earning functions for different types of engineers 
Intercept used in the simulations 3.01 (1) 3.20 (3) 2.97 (3)
Estimation of wage equation on FLFS 1990-2002
Intercept 2.63 * 2.79 * 2.59 (2)
Years of experience 0.051 * 0.050 *
Years of experience (square) -0.0009 * -0.0007 *
Female -0.15 * -0.15 *
Civil servant 0.04 * -0.04837 ns
Number of hours (per month) -0.002 * -0.009 *
Youth unemployment rate 0.25 ns 0.69 ns
Economic sector
Manufactures and construction 0.047 * -0.009 ns
Energy sector 0.142 * 0.164 *
Finance sector 0.128 * 0.120 *
Services for firms 0.026 * -0.017 ns
Services for consumers -0.220 * -0.185 *
Administration -0.115 * -0.106 *
Other sectors 0.011 ns 0.035 ns
R-square 0.24 0.25
The 'most 
prestigious' 
Schools and 
'normal' 
Engineering 
Schools
The 'most 
prestigious' 
Schools
The 'normal' 
Engineering 
Schools
 
Source: French Labour Force Survey 1990-2002 (Insee)—authors’ calculation. 
Note: (*) for 1% and (ns) for no significance. (1) This intercept corresponds to the one which is presented in table 4.1, last column, (2) this 
intercept could be computed from the two other intercepts and the probability of being from a ‘most prestigious’ school (19.9%), (3) this 
intercept is computed from the intercept estimated with the FLFS 1990-2002 and from the intercept for engineers’ wage equation whatever 
the type estimated with the FLFS 2003-2005. 
 
 
After determining the way to simulate the engineers’ wages by pedigree, as it were, it is 
important to determine the type of the engineers —elite versus normal —in the input data of 
the GAMEO model. With our input data constituted with the FLFS 2003-2005, it is not 
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possible to know the provenance of the degrees of the engineers. We decided to duplicate 
each engineer observation (one for the elite schools, one for the others) and to modify their 
weight according to their individual probability of being of one particular type 
Diagram 2.2 illustrates how this differentiation is obtained: we randomly affect the non 
explained part of the wages11 which enables us to compute a potential wage; the probability of 
having graduated from an elite school is then computed based on individual characteristics; 
the engineer observation is duplicated—one elite and one normal—; the weights of these two 
new observations, which replace the former one, are corrected based on the probability of 
having graduated from an elite school.  
 
Diagram 2.2. Construction of elite school’s engineers in the input data of GAMEO 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 This wage residual stems from the current GAMEO determination of wages described in the section 4.2.  
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 More precisely, the individual probability—Ei in diagram 2.2 — is estimated as follows. 
First, we simulate a wage for the individual: 
 
iii uXY += b  
 
Where iY  is the log of the wage simulated, b  the coefficients of the engineer’s wage equation 
presented in table 4.112, iX  the individual characteristics and iu  a residual drawn from the 
residual pool obtained with the estimation of the engineer wage equa tion using FLFS 2003-
2005 data. The conditional probability (under a Gaussian assumption) of having graduated 
from an elite engineering school is then computed, using the wage equation for this type of 
engineer. 
 
( )
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ -
=
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
exp
1
s
b
s
ii
i
XY
p   
 
where 1s  is the standard deviation of the wages of a graduate of the elite engineering school, 
—the standard deviation is computed using the FLFS 1990-2002—, and 1b  the coefficients of 
the wage equation retained for the engineers graduates of the elite school. The conditional 
probability of an engineer having graduated from another school can then be written: 
 
( )
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ -
=
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
exp
1
s
b
s
ii
i
XY
p   
 
where 2s  is the standard deviation of wages of a graduate of a normal engineering school —
the standard deviation is computed using the FLFS 1990-2002—, and 2b  the coefficients of 
the wage equation retained for the engineers graduates of a normal school. If we assume that 
                                                 
12 It is worth noticing that it mimics the current process of wage determination with GAMEO which is detailed in 
section 4.1.  
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the statistical structure of the population is the same and that the proportion of engineers 
graduating from the elite school is the same for the two periods ( PESP ), we can compute an 
estimation of an individual’s probability of having graduated from one of the ‘most 
prestigious’ schools ( PESiP ) as follows (Bayes’ rule): 
 
( )PESiPESi
PESi
iPES PpPp
Pp
P
-×+×
×
=
121
1  
 
This probability is weighted with a coefficient to align the proportion of individuals with a 
diploma of an elite engineering school to the observed proportion in the 1990-2002 period 
(19.9%). 
 
2.3. Education output as a dynamic process: an overview  
The process of a GAMEO simulation is illustrated in the diagram 2.3.  
The input data base is produced by GAMEO-A. It represents the individuals of chosen 
generation with their characteristics as they appeared in the FLFS 2003-2006. To illustrate the 
simulations with GAMEO throughout the paper, we present some results stemming from 
Courtioux (2008, 2009), Courtioux and Houeto (2009) which focus on the 1970’s generation. 
These papers are based on the simulation of 34,643 individuals who represent the individuals 
born in 1970—around 850,000 people—in terms of sex, diploma and age upon entry into the 
labour force. The relative percentage of each case is approximated on the basis of the French 
Labour Force Survey (FLFS) 2003-2005 considering the people born between the 1968 and 
1972. The economic sector is determined for the lifetime. It is affected randomly on the basis 
of the distribution of economic sector of the individual aged 16 to 30 in the FLFS 2003-2005 
by gender and diploma.  
The modelled ageing process simulates the annual individual transitions between three main 
states: inactivity, employment and unemployment—for more detail see section 6.2. The 
simulation begins at sixteen, the legal age for the end of compulsory schooling. A Mincer 
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equation estimated by diploma is used to simulate the wage for those in employment. The 
equations corresponding to the transition process and the wage simulation are estimated on 
the FLFS 2003-2005. We then simulate the main features of the French socio-fiscal regime: 
unemployment benefits, retirement pensions and income tax—see section 4.3 for more 
details. The probability to survive is calculated until the individual is 100—we then assume 
that he dies. 
 
Diagram 2.3. The ageing process in the GAMEO model 
 
 
 
 
3. The simulation of the labour market positions over the life course 
One of the aims of GAMEO model is to simulate the distribution of individual position vis à 
vis the labour market by diploma over their life course. As explained in the introduction, we 
retain a generational approach. This methodological choice leads to differentiate the macro 
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destiny of a given generation and the impact of individual education on the distribution of the 
positions open to this generation.   
Section 3.1 explains how the macro targets of the different position at a given age for a given 
generation vis a vis the labour market are estimated. Section 3.2 explains how it is possible to 
estimate the impact of a given diploma on the probability of transition to a given position. 
Section 3.3 explains how the two former elements are used in the microsimulation process. 
 
3.1. Generational profile of activity and unemployment  
A first step consists in modelling the labour force participation rate and the unemployment 
rate over the life course for a given generation. The French Labour Force Survey 1968-2005 
is used to construct segments of labour participation rate and unemployment rate by age and 
generation. For instance, data available for the generation born in 1950 cover the ages 18 to 
55 which constitutes a segment of life, the generation born in 1960 from the age 16 to 45 –this 
constitutes another segment-, the generation born in 1970 from 16 to 35, etc. The model is 
estimated separately for males and females; it includes several specifications for age, the 
current unemployment rate for a generation at a given age and generation dummies. The 
equations estimated are specified as follow: 
 
DgUtgtgtgtgt
P
P
gt
gt ++-+-+-+-+=
-
432 )()()()()
1
log( jdcba   
 
where gtP  is the participation rate of the generation g  for the year t, U the unemployment rate 
and D a generation dummy.  
 
DgUtgtgtgt
U
U
gt
gt ++-+-+-+=
-
32 )()()()
1
log( dcba    
 
where gtU  is the unemployment rate of the generation g  for the year t, U the unemployment 
rate and D a generation dummy. The main results of the estimations are presented in table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1. Estimation of labour force participation and unemployment rate models 
Male Female Male Female
Intercept -21.25 * -27.11 * 3.53 * 3.25 *
Age 1.75 * 2.74 * -0.56 * -0.43 *
Age 2 -0.04 * -0.10 * 0.01 * 0.01 *
Age 3 0.00042 * 0.00153 * -0.00010 * -0.00007 *
Age 4 -0.000002 * -0.00001 *
Curent unemployement rate -3.44 * -1.81 * 0.26 * 0.03 *
R-Square 0.97 0.92 0.82 0.82
Logistic transformation of labour 
force participation rate
Logistic  transformation of 
unemployment rate
 
Source: Labour Force Survey 1968-2005 (Insee)— authors’ calculation. 
Note: taking 1970 for reference, this model is estimated with dummies for each generation; they are not 
reproduced here; (*) for 1% level of significance. 
 
 
3.2. Transition probability and the education effect 
In the microsimulation model, the transitions between inactivity, employment and 
unemployment are modelled. More precisely, five states are modelled: inactivity, self-
employment, employment in public sector, employment in private sector and unemployment. 
We are then interested in the modelling of the following conditional transition probability: 
)1( =itaP  where tia  is the probability of being in activity at the t period, )11( == titi asP  
where tis  is the probability of being self-employed at the t period, )0,1/1( === ititit sapP  
where tip  is the probability  of being employed in the public sector at the t 
period, )0,0,1/1( ==== tiititit psaeP where tie   is the probability of being employed in the 
private sector at the t period. 
The individual probability of transition is calculated using binomial logit models, which are 
estimated on the French Labour Force Survey 2003-2007. The variables used in the model 
include the former position—which explains an important part of the transition 
probability13—, some variables describing the socio-economic status, and diploma. The 
equation estimated is the following:  
 
itittiit DSYY jdba +++= - )1(  
                                                 
13 See table 3.2. 
ha
l-0
03
91
39
3,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 3
 J
un
 2
00
9
 16 
 
 
where iY  is the transition estimated, S a matrix of socio-economic variables and D the 
diploma. The results are presented in table 3.2. It should be noted that the variables used in 
the estimation of the various equations needed to model individual transitions are not all 
included in the equations used to simulate the individual trajectory. The socio-economic 
variables concerning the family’s position –number of children if female, young children if 
female- are included in the estimations to capture their impact on individual transitions on the 
labour market. They are not however included in the microsimulation of individual 
transitions: since our analysis is restricted to single individuals, the use of these variables is 
not warranted. 
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Table 3.2. Estimation of transition models 
Intercept 0.261 * 2.196 * 1.434 * 2.108 *
Former position
Inactive ref -5.438 * -5.336 * -1.834 *
Unemployment 2.489 * -6.610 * -6.341 * -3.091 *
Self-Employment 5.057 * ref -5.555 * -1.834 *
Employment (public sector) 4.166 * -10.020 * ref -1.874 *
Employment (private sector) 3.794 * -8.122 * -6.326 * ref
Socio-economic status
Female -0.230 * -0.601 * 0.548 * -0.072 *
Number of Children (if female) -0.089 * 0.066 * 0.008 * -0.091 *
Young Children (if female) -1.579 * 0.126 * 0.143 * 0.101 *
Age 55 and more -1.491 *
Age 60 and more -1.373 *
Age 65 and more -0.352 *
Years of experience -0.018 * 0.040 * 0.067 * 0.045 *
Years of experience (square) -0.00003 * -0.001 * -0.001 *
Out of the Labour force duration (in years) -0.365 *
Long term unemployment -13.459 ** -16.551 *
Diploma
No Higher Education Diploma
CAP/BEP 0.354 * -0.054 * 0.553 * 0.300 *
Bac Général 0.262 * 0.359 * 0.500 * 0.337 *
Bac Professionnel 0.914 * 0.295 * 0.083 * 0.653 *
Bac Technique 0.495 * 0.056 * 0.593 * 0.451 *
Capacité en Droit (1) 0.934 * 0.163 ** -0.841 * -0.396 *
Two-year degree
DEUG (University) 0.078 * 1.036 * 0.470 * 0.124 *
DUT/DEUST (University) 0.772 * -0.285 * 0.275 * 0.848 *
BTS 0.617 * 0.471 * 0.008 ns 0.681 *
Other Higher Technician Diploma 0.068 * 0.691 * 0.110 * -0.042 *
Paramedical Diploma 0.376 * 2.421 * 3.606 * 1.121 *
Three-year degree
Licence (University) 0.139 * 0.576 * 1.212 * 0.272 *
Others three-year degree 0.739 * 0.905 * 0.302 * 0.613 *
Four-year degree
Maîtrise (University) 0.314 * 0.637 * 0.844 * 0.202 *
Five-year degree
DEA (University) 0.511 * 0.242 * 0.826 * 0.190 *
DESS (University) 0.859 * -0.112 * 0.429 * 0.391 *
Business Schools 1.164 * -0.464 * -0.626 * 0.529 *
Engineering Schools 0.827 * 0.671 * 0.151 * 0.634 *
Degree of more than five years
PhD (Medical Degree excluded) 0.935 * 0.344 * 1.362 * 0.422 *
PhD (Medical Degree) 0.694 * 0.796 * 3.223 * 1.205 *
Sommers' D 0.955 0.958 0.911 0.72
P. Conc. 97.7 97.6 95.2 85.6
P. Disc. 2.2 1.9 4.2 13.5
P. Tied 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.9
(public sector) (private sector)
Transition to 
activity
Transition to self-
employment
Transition to 
employment 
Transition to 
employment 
 
Source: French Labour Force Survey 2003-2005 (Insee) – authors’ calculations. 
Note: (*) for 1% and (**) for 5% level of significance. (1) Capacité en droit is a university law degree which 
does not imply earlier success on the Bac; it concerns almo st 0.7% of the 1970 generation.  
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3.3. Simulating transitions over a lifetime  
In the microsimulation model, the transitions between inactivity, employment and 
unemployment are modelled. More precisely, five states are modelled: inactivity, self-
employment, employment in the public sector, employment in the private sector and 
unemployment.  
The microsimulation of transitions over a lifetime replicates the same pattern for each year—
see diagram 3.1. It proceeds as follows. First, the probability of transition to the position of 
activity is calculated, a random variable is drawn from a uniform probability law on the unit 
segment and the status—active versus inactive— is selected depending on the realized value 
of the random variable.. This resolution includes a global alignment to the generation’s rates, 
the calculation of which was described in section 3.1. Then, knowing that the individual is 
active, the probability of being self-employed is calculated and a similar procedure applies. 
Then, knowing that the individual is active and not self-employed, the probability of being in 
employment in the public sector is calculated and a similar procedure applies—we assume 
that the public sector constitutes a fixed share of employment that corresponds to the mean 
(20%) of the period from 1968 to 2003. Then, knowing that the individual is active but neither 
in self-employment nor in the public sector, the probability of having a job in the private 
sector is calculated. The individuals in unemployment are those who remain  unaffected at the 
end of the process. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the results that are used to simulate the destiny of the generation 
born in 1970. They represent the rate of labour force participation and the unemployment 
rates over the course of a lifetime, which are simulated for the 1970 generation. For these 
simulations, we assume a current unemployment rate of 8%, which corresponds to the French 
unemployment rate in 2008. 
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Figure 3.1. Labour force participation over the course of a lifetime 
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Source: authors ’ calculations.  
Note: simulation is based on the hypothesis of a current employment rate 8% for the 1970 generation.  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Unemployment rate over the course of a lifetime 
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Source: authors ’ calculations.  
Note: simulation is based on the hypothesis of current employment rate of 8% for the 1970 generation. 
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Diagram 3.1. The process of transition on the labour market in the GAMEO model 
 
 
 
 
 
4. The simulation of individual income  
For individuals the level of income is linked to their education characteristics and their 
present situation on the labour market (employment versus non employment). However, as far 
as socio-fiscal regimes are concerned, the present income—which could be composed of 
unemployment benefit or retirement pension for instance—is linked to the past chronicle of 
income and related contributions to social insurance. A microsimulation of the education 
output in France has to differentiate the wage in employment position according to the 
diploma and to take into account the related rights and contributions to other social incomes 
over the life course. 
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Section 4.1 explains the way we estimate the impact of education on wage over the life 
course. Section 4.2 presents the main features of the French socio-fiscal regime which are 
simulated.  
 
4.1. Modelling wages 
To model wages, we estimate separately Mincer’s earnings equations by diplomas specified 
as follows: 
 
ididdiddidddid Xeew ejdba ++++= ...)log(
2     
 
Where idw  is the hourly wage —as available in the FLFS 2003-2005—of the individual i with 
a diploma d, ide  the number of years of experience, and X a matrix of variables which 
characterize the individual—gender and the young unemployment rate at the beginning of its 
career— and the job —civil servant, economic sector, etc. 
This model aims at capturing differentiated wage profiles over the career as a function of the 
diplomas obtained; the traditional experience effect is then estimated by diploma —see table 
4.1 for detailed estimates. The model includes additional variables to estimate the ‘real 
specific’ effect of diploma on earnings over the career:  
 
-To capture a potential generation effect in the estimation of the Mincer equation we 
control the estimation by the unemployment rate among young people –under 25 
years- at the labour force entering age. To simulate wages we assume that this rate is 
constant over the period we simulate (8%). 
-To capture the career effect for women in the estimation, we control the wage 
equation by a dummy for sex. However this effect is not included in the simulations. 
We assume that the gender differences in the generation aggregate rate of labour force 
participation and unemployment rate that are introduced in the microsimulation 
already simulate the specificity of women’s careers in our model.  
-To capture the specificity of civil servant’s wage careers, a dummy for employment 
(or not) in the public sector is included in the estimation.  
-To capture sector wage specificities, a set of dummies is introduced in the estimation. 
For the wage simulation, we assume that an individual makes her whole career in the 
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same sector. This sector is imputed randomly based on the observed repartition in the 
FLFS 2003-2005 of the different diplomas in the different economic sectors. 
-The working time is introduced as a control in the estimation. For the simulations, we 
assume that all jobs are full-time jobs and we arbitrarily set the working time at 150 
hours per month.  
  
Because of the small number of observations for some diplomas, we pool some diplomas for 
the estimations. In case of pooled estimations, we identify the specific effect of a given 
diploma by a dummy. We use a particular methodology to decide which diplomas have to be 
pooled. The pooling is based on the proximity of diplomas regarding their situation in the 
labour market. In order to identify the proximity of diplomas we use a data analysis whose 
results are available on request. When the results of the data analysis are not sufficient, the 
pooling is based on the proximity of diplomas considering their higher education level. 
Finally, eight earning equations are estimated with six equations concerning higher education 
diplomas. The results of the estimates are shown in table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1. Estimation of earning equations by diploma  
Intercept 2.2 * 2.3 * 2.2 * 2.2 * 2.1 * 2.7 * 2.6 * 3.0 *
Years of experience 0.012 * 0.030 * 0.020 * 0.030 * 0.026 * 0.037 * 0.040 * 0.055 *
Years of experience (square) -0.0001 * -0.0005 * -0.0001 * -0.0002 ns -0.0003 * -0.0005 * -0.0006 * -0.0010 *
Female -0.14 * -0.12 * -0.14 * -0.16 * -0.11 * -0.13 * -0.12 * -0.16 *
Civil Servant 0.18 * 0.05 ** 0.13 * 0.05 ** 0.07 * 0.17 * 0.01 ns 0.13 *
Number of hours (per month) -0.001 * -0.001 * -0.001 * -0.002 * -0.001 * -0.003 * -0.001 * -0.003 *
Young unemployment rate -0.08 ns -1.54 * -0.04 ns 1.27 ns 0.90 * 0.04 n s 0.19 ns -1.85 *
Economic sector
Manufactures and construction 0.003 ns 0.030 ** 0.007 ns 0.037 ** 0.033 * 0.025 n s 0.110 * 0.026 n s
Energy sector 0.254 * 0.195 * 0.230 * 0.082 * 0.166 * 0.198 * 0.201 * 0.150 *
Finance sector 0.117 * 0.090 * 0.063 * 0.081 * 0.063 * 0.080 * 0.071 * 0.051 n s
Services for firms -0.025 * -0.018 ns -0.015 ** 0.039 * 0.004 ns 0.029 * * 0.041 * 0.034 ***
Services for consumers -0.166 * -0.122 * -0.145 * -0.114 * -0.181 * -0.152 * -0.253 * -0.140 *
Administration -0.134 * -0.100 * -0.078 * -0.070 * -0.058 * -0.095 * -0.086 * -0.242 *
Other sectors -0.049 * -0.074 * -0.063 * -0.055 * -0.028 * -0.086 * -0.084 * 0.120 *
Diploma
No higer education diploma
Without diploma -0.06 *
CAP/BEP ref.
General Bac ref.
Professionnal Bac
Technical Bac -0.04 *
Capacité en Droit (3) -0.10 **
Higher education diploma
DEUG (University) 0.10 *
DUT/DEUST (University)
BTS ref.
Other Higher Technician Diploma 0.00 ns
Paramedical Diploma 0.17 *
Licence (University) -0.08 *
Other Three-Year degree 0.13 *
Maîtrise (University) ref.
DEA (University) -0.01 ns
DESS (University) ref.
Business School 0.07 *
Engineering School
PhD (Medical Degree excluded) 0.06 *
PhD (Medical Degree) 0.29 *
R-square 0.27 0.36 0.41 0.51 0.47 0.49 0.45 0.55
DESS, DEA, 
Business 
School, PhD
Engineering 
School (1)
Without diploma 
or CAP/BEP
Professionnal 
Bac
General and 
Technical Bac, 
Capacité en 
droit (3) and 
DEUG
DUT/DEUST
BTS, Other 
Higher 
Technicians 
and 
Paramedical
Licence, Other 
three-year 
degree and 
Maîtrise
 
Source: French Labour Force Survey 2003-2005 (Insee)—authors’ calculation. 
Note: (*) for 1% and (**) for 5% level of significance; (ns) for no significance. (1) The intercept presented here is not used in this form in the 
simulations, see table 2.1 ; (2) Capacité en droit is a university law degree which does not imply passage of the Bac; it concerns almost 0.7% 
of the 1970 generation.  
 
 
 The individual residuals corresponding to the estimates are stocked and used during the 
simulation. Based on a random process, the microsimulation gives each simulated individual 
an observed residual depending on his diploma. During the dynamic simulation process, the 
residual is conserved until the individual leaves employment; when he finds a new job, a new 
residual is then randomly matched. Unfortunately, data on self-employment earnings are not 
available in the FLFS. In the simulation we decided to impute wages as a proxy of self-
employment earnings. 
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Diagram 4.1. Wages in the GAMEO model 
 
 
 
 
4.2. The socio-fiscal regime 
The microsimulation takes into account the main features of the French socio-fiscal regime: 
the unemployment benefit, pensions and income tax. According to French social legislation, 
the calculation of workers’ rights to unemployment benefits and pensions is linked to gross 
wages, which are not available in the FLFS. We assume that the gross wages are a fixed share 
(120%) of net wages, which are available in the FLFS. 
 The regular unemployment benefit is simulated: the Allocation d’aide au retour à l’emploi 
(ARE). The entitlement and the amount of that benefit is legally linked to past wages and 
employment duration. In our simulation the amount of the allowance is calculated for the 
individuals who become unemployed on the legal basis. 
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The three main parts of the pension system are simulated. The basic pension is calculated 
based on the 25 best years, which are simulated. The differing complementary are also 
calculated. White-collar professionals (cadres) have a specific scheme. We assume that those 
with a five-year higher education degree or more are cadres. The complementary pensions are 
based on payroll taxes actually paid over the career. The civil servants’ regime is also 
simulated; it concerns those who have worked more than 41 years in the public sector; their 
pension is a fixed share of their last wage. 
The French income tax is based not on individuals but on a particular definition of a 
household. Theoretically, the tax depends on the number of people (including children) in this 
‘fiscal household’.  In our simulation, we assume that the individual is single. This means that 
the macro revenues of income tax are overestimated as far as they do not take into account the 
wage cut (dépense fiscale) for family conditions (capacité contributive).  
 
 
5. Modelling life expectation differentiated by education level 
The existence of a correlation between education and life expectancy is well documented14 
and confirmed for France15. However, the real impact of education on life expectancy is 
hardly apprehended, because of the correlation of education with some other variables 
(mainly the income) which may impact life expectancy. When one controls for the effect of 
these variables the impact of education tends to decrease but remains significant16. In this 
framework, our modelling strategy consists in introducing in GAMEO a mean life expectation 
for each individual corresponding to his education characteristics. 
In France mortality tables by education level are not available. However Vallin and Meslé 
(2001) and Robert-Bobée (2006) give some cross-section mortality tables by socio-economic 
status. To estimate the mortality tables by diploma for the individual of a given generation we 
proceed in two steps. In a first hand, we estimate cross-section mortality tables by diploma for 
the 1991-1999 period—section 5.1.  In a second hand, we define a method to forecast these 
tables for other periods—section 5.2.  
 
                                                 
14 For instance Kunst and Mackenbach (1994), Mackenbach et alii (2003, 2008). 
15 Menvielle et alii (2007). 
16 See for instance Schnittker (2006), Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006) 
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5.1. Modelling survival functions  
To model mortality differentials, we first compute a mortality table by diploma. We use 
mortality tables by age, gender and socio-economic status—currently available for France— 
and the French Labour Force Survey (FLFS) for this computation. Robert-Bobée and Monteil 
(2005) provided mortality rates for the 1991-1999’s period. In order to transform these tables, 
we apply the mortality rates by age, gender and socio-economic status for this period to the 
individuals in the FLFS 2003-2005. We then compute the average mortality rate by level of 
education in the FLFS sample. This sample is too small to produce highly disaggregated 
tables by level of education so we had to combine some diplomas. In the aggregation process, 
we choose to maintain as much as possible a differentiation by education type: for instance we 
differentiated the high school degrees according to their type—general versus specialized—, 
we differentiated the higher education diplomas according to their specificity —grandes 
écoles versus University degree. Finally, we retain eleven diploma categories: 
 
1- The individuals who do not have post-primary school diploma.  
2-Those who have a professional middle-school degree (CAP,BEP). 
3-Those who have a ‘general’ high school degree (General Baccalauréat). 
4-Those who have a ‘specialized’ high school degree (Professional Baccalauréat 
Technical Baccalauréat) or who complete a particular Law University degree 
which is open to those who do not pass their high school degree (capacité en 
droit). 
5-Those who have a two years higher education degree (DEUG, DUT, BTS, High 
level technical degree). 
6-Those who have a two years higher education degree in paramedical training. 
 7-Those who have a three years  higher education degree. 
8-Those who completed a four-years degree at University (maîtrise) or in a school.  
9-Those who completed a master degree at University (research oriented or 
professional). 
10-Engineering and Business Schools ’ master degree.  
11-Those who have completed a PhD  
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The data on mortality rates by socio-economic status and the FLFS used do not correspond to 
the same period. The mortality tables concern the 1991-1999’s period, but they were applied 
to the FLFS 2003-2004. A computation based on the FLFS 1991-1999 was possible, but we 
choose to not use it because the available diploma variable for that period is not disaggregated 
enough for the analysis we intend to carry out. This mismatch in the periods might affect the 
mortality rates if the relative proportion of various socio-economic groups in the population 
has changed between 1991-1999 and 2003-2005. In order to assess the extend of this potential 
problem, we analyse the repartition of the population into the various socio-economic groups 
between 1999 and 2003, the last years of the two periods considered—the tables are available 
on request. We find that this repartition hasn’t changed significantly overall, although there 
are a few changes that introduce a small bias in our estimations. For example, between the 
two years, the proportion of individuals with a university degree that are in a high socio-
economic status has slightly decreased, and at the same time the proportion of these 
individuals that are out of the workforce has slightly increased. Knowing that individuals in 
high SES have a lower mortality rate than those that are out the workforce, the observed trend 
will induce a slight overestimation of the mortality of the individuals with postsecondary 
education, compared to the real mortality rates by level of education between 1991-1999. In a 
similar manner we slightly underestimate the mortality of individuals with lower level 
diplomas. The consequence of this is that we might slightly underestimate mortality 
differentials by level of education.  
The second step is to estimate the relationship between mortality by age and diploma. In order 
to do so, we estimate a function that differentiates the effect linked to the mean mortality of a 
generation ( b ) from an age effect ( g and d ) and an intercept (a ). We estimate the following 
equation for men and women separately:  
 
 
 
 
where: 
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ee .21 ggg +=    
ee .21 ddd +=    
 
and M stands for Mortality rate, s for sex, a for age, and e for level of education.  
The interaction terms reflect the fact that the impact of the level of education on mortality is 
not due solely to a difference in the intercept -the coefficient a- of the mortality curves -i.e. a 
difference in value for each age-, but also to a difference in the slope –the coefficient b- of the 
curves -i.e. a difference in the evolution of mortality as age increases. This specification is 
inspired by Insee (1999), but we add interactions with age -and age squared- to reflect the fact 
that the impact of the level of education on mortality decreases towards the end of life. This 
specification is justified by Robert-Bobée et Cadot (2007)’s results: they show that although 
mortality differentials persist in old age, their magnitude decreases. We estimate equation 8 
using on the one hand the mortality tables by level of diploma that we computed, and on the 
other hand the mortality tables by age and sex provided by Vallin and Meslé (2001). The 
results of our regression are reported in table 5.1. 
This modelling enables the computation of survival functions. As expected, those with the 
highest levels of education have better survival rates. Consistent with the literature, mortality 
differentials are smaller for women.  
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Table 5.1. Regression of mortality by age on mortality by level of education  
Variable
intercept (a 1 ) 1.1832 * -1.221 *
Mean mortality by age (ß 1 ) 1.0997 * 0.8383 *
Age (?1 ) -0.0116 * -0.0053 *
Age2 (d 1 ) 0.0000 ns 0.0002 *
Education (a  2 )
CAP – BEP -0.5125 * -0.3404 *
Bac. général 1.148 * -0.7679 *
Bac. profesionnel et technologique, capacité en droit -0.4375 ns -0.3675 *
Paramedical degree -7.6262 * -1.267 *
Other two-years degree 1.2109 * -0.5218 *
Three-years degree -1.4988 * -0.941 *
Four-years degree 5.1688 * -1.3131 *
Master degree (University) -2.3255 * 0.0131 ns
Engineer and Business Schools -1.3314 * -2.4456 *
PhD 7.1069 * -2.7472 *
Interaction between Education and  mean Mortality by age  (ß  2 )
CAP – BEP -0.0363 *** -0.0309 *
Bac. général 0.0558 ns -0.0799 *
Bac. profesionnel et technologique, capacité en droit -0.153 * -0.0364 **
Paramedical degree -1.0102 * -0.0958 *
Other two-years degree 0.071 ** -0.0267 *
Three-years degree -0.2511 * -0.0684 *
Four-years degree 0.5859 * -0.106 *
Master degree (University) -0.3388 * 0.0704 *
Engineer and Business Schools -0.1213 ** -0.1822 *
PhD 0.8084 * -0.2468 *
Interaction between Education and Age (?  2 )
CAP – BEP 0.005 * 0.0000 *
Bac. général -0.0368 * 0.0001 *
Bac. profesionnel et technologique, capacité en droit -0.0347 * 0.0001 *
Paramedical degree 0.0075 ns 0.0001 *
Other two-years degree -0.0435 * 0.0000 ns
Three-years degree -0.0249 * 0.0001 *
Four-years degree -0.0555 * 0.0001 *
Master degree (University) -0.0197 * 0.0000 *
Engineer and Business Schools -0.0097 * 0.0000 *
PhD -0.0791 * 0.0002 *
Interaction between Education and Age-square (d  2 )
CAP – BEP 0.0000 ns -0.001 *
Bac. général 0.0003 * -0.0027 *
Bac. profesionnel et technologique, capacité en droit 0.0004 * -0.0064 *
Paramedical degree 0.0007 * 0.0046 *
Other two-years degree 0.0004 * 0.0002 *
Three-years degree 0.0004 * 0.0012 *
Four-years degree 0.0001 ** 0.0022 *
Master degree (University) 0.0004 * 0.0036 *
Engineer and Business Schools 0.0002 * 0.0184 *
PhD 0.0001 * 0.0096 *
R2 0.9978 0.9998
Men Women
 
Source: FLFS 2003-2005 (Insee), Vallin and Meslé (2001), Robert-Bobée and Monteil (2005)-authors’ 
calculations. 
Note: The category of reference for the education variable is « No Diploma ». 
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4.2. Forecasting survival functions  
The previous sub-section showed how we estimate mortality differential by diploma at a 
given point of time. In this subsection, we explain the methodology of forecasting mortality 
rate for a given generation which by definition covers several points in time. To illustrate this 
issue, if one considers the 1970’s generation, one needs the differential in mortality rate in 
2000, when the individuals are thirty17 ; for this, we can reasonably use the estimations 
previously presented (which is for the 2003-2004 period), but the mortality rate differential is 
also needed for each year of the period where an individual born in 1970 is still alive. 
Mortality rates have been decreasing in France for the past two and half centuries (Pison 
2005) and in order to model the average yearly decrease in mortality rate we need the 
mortality rates for two points in time. Unfortunately the only mortality forecasts available are 
of mortality by age and gender only –see Vallin and Meslé (2001). There are no mortality 
forecasts for 2049 by level of education, so we made the hypothesis that the evolution of 
mortality rates over time is the same regardless of the level of education. We therefore applied 
the average yearly decrease in mortality by age and gender only to the mortality rates by 
education level. This hypothesis is conservative and does not correspond to results available 
on the evolution of mortality rate by education level in France (Menvielle et al 2007). This 
conservative hypothesis is however the one that is the most consistent with our methodology. 
In the estimation of salaries in the microsimulation model, we do not include a change in the 
wage differential by level/type of diploma. Similarly we do not model any other changes over 
time (such as changes in access to health care for example) that could explain the evolution of 
the mortality differential. It is therefore only coherent that we would choose the conservative 
hypothesis under which the mortality differential by level of education remains constant over 
time in our model.  
This extrapolation assumes that mortality decreases in a linear manner over time. This 
assumption seems reasonable given the fact that the evolution of mortality rates in France has 
so far been linear, as the available data shows (Vallin and Meslé 2001). 
                                                 
17 We do not consider mortality differentials before 30 years because the full impact of education differentials on 
mortality are not likely to be visible before that age. In addition, individuals who decide to pursue studies that 
last long (such as medicine or a doctorate) are not likely to enter the workforce before they are around 30 years 
old. 
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To forecast the mortality rate differential throughout the years, we use mortality rates in 1991-
1999 and we extrapolate them from the mid point of the 1991-1999 period—i.e. 1995-—
forward to the desired year, as follows. 
 
 
  
 
where Mae (n) is the mortality rate by age and level of education for year n.   
We first compute the difference between the log of mortality rates at two periods—here in 
1995 and in 2049—and then divide this value by the number of years separating the two 
periods—here 54—, to obtain the average yearly decrease in the log of mortality. This yearly 
increase is then multiplied by the number of years between the year of interest—here it is n—
and the starting year—here 1995—, and added to the log of the mortality rate in the starting 
year -here 1995.  
In the ageing process of GAMEO there is not ‘real killing’ of individuals: each individual 
trajectory is simulated from age 16 to age 100. However, there is a specific weight of the 
individual for every year. It is calculated by correcting the individual weight of the former 
year by the mortality rate at this given age.   
 
5. Conclusion 
With the GAMEO model it is possible to simulate the distribution of the chronicles of income 
for a given generation. Until now, the model has been mainly used to simulate the trajectories 
of the generation of the individuals born in 1970 and to discuss French higher education 
policy. This output joined with a set of hypothesis, consisting mainly in defining the 
opportunity cost of one more year of education, enables to calculate individual indicators like 
internal rate of return to education and to decompose them: Courtioux and Houeto (2009) 
propose a risk analysis of return to education and discuss the implicit monetary incentive 
framework of complete a given diploma; Courtioux (2008, 2009) analyses the impact of the 
implementation of an income contingent loan for higher education18 on the individual returns 
to education. This output can also produces macro indicators: Courtioux (2008, 2009) 
                                                 
18 For a general presentation of income contingent loan see Chapman (2006).  
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evaluates the revenues of different income contingent loan schemes as well as the progressive 
development of these revenues.  
However, to produce more complete policy evaluations the GAMEO model has to be further 
developed in several ways. An important challenge is to introduce the simulation of family 
formation and its implications for income tax and other elements of the French socio-fiscal 
regime. This part is important to go further than a simple risk analysis and to produce a more 
precise insight of the macro implications of the policies analyzed. Another aspect is to 
strengthen the estimation of mortality rate by diploma, which could be done by an access to 
some demographic data like the Echantillon Démographique Permanent (Insee). 
More generally, the model is based on the structure of the ‘new’ annual French Labour Force 
Survey; the availability of new data will enables us to produces more precise estimations of 
earning equations and transition equations for the forthcoming versions of the GAMEO 
model.  
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